


























































































Table 1: The Five Largest Brazilian Cities City  State  Region  Population  Population Density (per square km) 
Subnormal Agglomerates (S.A.) Population 























North  3.07%  3.23%  46.94%  12.53%  1.49% Northeast  9.60%  2.93%  30.96%  6.47%  6.36% Southeast  29.00%  1.30%  24.49%  8.23%  1.21% South  20.07%  2.92%  19.14%  4.84%  3.74% Central West  2.39%  2.78%  27.48%  5.02%  No data  
In addition to the differences in both the quantitative composition and quality of housing in the city of Salvador, physical conditions are very different from those in other major Brazilian cities. Salvador occupies 693 square kilometers on a peninsula with the Atlantic Ocean to the northeast and the Bay of All Saints to the southwest. This greatly limits the availability of developable land and is drastically different from the less constrained Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo. Most of the informal communities in Salvador are located along the Bay of All Saints, near industrial areas with lower land values. The higher income residential areas are concentrated along the Atlantic shoreline to the northeast of the city, with fewer informal communities that are smaller in size. This can be seen in Figure 3. Comparing it with Figure 4 then brings out the relationship of the ‘popular’ areas with informal housing. This contrasts with Rio de Janeiro, a city with high‐income residential areas adjacent to informal communities, a result of the formation of favelas on the hillsides of the city during the middle of the twentieth century. The city of São Paulo also varies in its geographic composition of housing, with the majority of informal communities being located on the urban fringe of the continuously expanding city. The urban center contains the highest value residential housing, close to its 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commercial epicenter.
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Figure 3 
Figure 4 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Part IV: Urban Development in Salvador 
Salvador, the first capital of Brazil, began experiencing strong rural to urban migration in the early 20th century. This was a result of a combination of push and pull factors. The city was marked by its growth as a major port city and the abolition of slavery in the late 1800’s, drawing rural migrants and former slaves searching for employment opportunities (Freir, 2010). The foundation of Salvador’s economy was through the export of cacao, but began to expand after its port was remodeled in 1928. Population growth was relatively slow between 1920 and 1940, at only 2% per year, but then rapidly increased to 43.65% between the years of 1940‐1950, to 290,433 habitants. Early densification in the city began in housing called cortiços, providing rooms for rent that sheltered poor workers in what were essentially boarding houses. These accommodated a high number of occupants per unit and were very unhealthy causing the public power to seek to eradicate this particular form of low‐income housing. The later influx of new residents in the city began to lead to a pattern of disordered informal settlements forming on the city’s periphery, as low‐income, worker housing was largely unavailable. This began to mark a change in the composition of housing for the city of Salvador. 
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, there was limited urban planning within Salvador, leading to limited separation of land use in the city. In the early 1900’s, land was owned and controlled primarily by a small number of rich families and the Catholic Church, held in a few land trusts and by real estate companies owned by the wealthy. Before the 1920’s, government intervention in housing was 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limited to programs promoting hygiene, sanitation, and building safety. However, the rapid growth experienced in the 1940’s began to draw attention to the informal housing being constructed on the urban periphery and the resulting and stark inequalities of housing (Frier, 2010). The first initiatives at combating this disequilibrium and better urban planning in the city were taken in 1943 with the creation of the Escritório de Planejamento e Urbanismo da Cidade de Salvador (The Office of Planning and Urbanization of the City of Salvador‐‐EPUCS). This organization was more concerned with the design of the city than the provision of housing and equal use of space, but it was a beginning of urban spatial planning. Additionally, EPUCS gave guidelines for urban growth and the construction of popular housing in Salvador, making it possible for areas to be occupied by groups of individuals with limited buying power.  
The first informal communities in Salvador began with the formation of the area of Corta‐Braço in what is now known as the neighborhood of Liberdade in 1946. This established a pattern of informal communities as a solution to the lack of affordable formal housing. Additionally, many informal communities were erected as housing for those working in the growing residential construction industries in middle‐ and upper‐income parts of the city. Informal residents began to place pressure on the municipal government to provide a solution to their housing difficulties while insisting that the lack of housing was not the root issue, but the lack of available land on which to place it (Cities Alliance, 2008). 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In the decades following the 1950’s, Salvador continued to experience growth and dramatic change as its economic base shifted from agricultural entrepôt to industry. The discovery of oil in Bahia prompted the creation of Petrobras in 1953 and the beginning of drilling and extraction in the city’s hinterland. This created an even greater motive for migration to Salvador, as employment opportunities in both the refining and associated chemical industries began to materialize. The population of Salvador grew 62% in the years of 1950‐1960 and was marked by further increase in low‐income workers without options for housing. Two major industrial areas were then constructed in the late 1960’s: the Central Industry of Aratu (CIA) and the Camaçari Petrochemical Plant. These plants marked another surge in employment and hence the demand for housing. At the same time, major roadways were constructed to provide access to the expanding suburbs.   
The 1960 national census recorded a population of 635,917 habitants in the city of Salvador, growing to over 2.08 million by 1991. This marked a nearly quadruple growth in the population of the city: a serious challenge to the private construction of housing and public housing programs to accommodate it. As a result, by the year 2000, there was a housing deficit of just over 200,000 homes in the city. The city also began to change geographically to house the growing population. In its founding year of 1551, Salvador occupied approximately 20 hectares of land and 30 square kilometers in 1940. By 1980, the city comprised 160 square kilometers of urban space and a population of 1.49 million inhabitants. In 2006, the surface area of Salvador included 312 square kilometers of completely urbanized space, with no more available space for housing projects. This prompted further expansion of the 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city to 693 square kilometers by 2013, even while having to house a still growing population, estimated to be 2,888,672 by that year. 
As a result of its growing population, limited space, and the increasing value of land, Salvador has adopted policies to clear informal settlements for other, more profitable housing and commercial developments. For capitalist firms, land is a financial asset, a means to further accumulation, and both governments and international agencies aim to facilitate this process (Karruna, 2013). Accordingly, many of the actions taken against informal communities in the city are a result of land speculation.  
A common policy has been to remove informal communities and place their inhabitants in formal housing projects on the urban periphery to clear room for private development. By placing housing communities on the urban edge, more valuable land plots can be sold for private residential or commercial development.  This is beneficial to the city as they gain from the taxable revenue in these areas subsequent to development, and where they own the land, they gain from its sale. The advantage of peripheral location for new low‐income housing projects, on the other hand, is usually the low price of the land there. Other examples of land speculation can also be seen. In some instances where it is private land that has been invaded, the private owner may negotiate with the city government to acquire a better and more valuable land plot; something that may be attractive to the city as it relieves them from what might be a politically tricky expulsion process (Karruna, 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2013). This is seen in the case of the informal community of Escada, discussed below. 
Part V: The Case Studies 
This section discusses at length two informal communities within Salvador and the associated issues of their occupation. The neighborhood of Escada and two informal communities, Recanto Feliz and Paraíso Azul, in the area of Costa Azul, illustrate the politics of housing in Salvador as it impacts informal dwellers. 
Escada 
The informal community of Escada exhibits many aspects of city housing policy in relation to informal communities. These include the involvement of multiple actors in the policy process, processes of eviction of, and reoccupation by, informal residents, and the implications of policy actions. Particularly apparent are the influence of land speculation, the self‐interested activities of the municipality and the measures of resistance taken by opposing groups. These activities have implications for other informal settlements, as the practices in question are by no means unique to Escada.  
Figure 5 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Escada is located on the northwestern edge of the municipality of Salvador, situated between the Bay of All Saints and the nature preserve of the Boca da Mata de Valéria. It comprises a lower income area near the major industrial zone of the municipality of Salvador and has a relatively large number of distinct informal communities. Escada was first occupied by  low‐income families that moved into the area in 2006, onto vacant land owned by the electrical company COELBA. As such, and according to Brazilian land policy, the landowner assumes responsibility for evicting illegal occupants. The structures in the community were built up over the course of several years, but the majority were made of non‐permanent materials. The community also developed a numbering system for businesses and homes in addition to a community center and school building: evidence of some degree of its cohesion.  
The subsequent struggles of the informal occupants of Escada to remain there brought together a number of different actors concerned in some way with the housing of the poor. In addition to the residents and various departments of provincial and municipal government, a variety of social organizations and private business were also involved. For a start, the residents relied on assistance from community organizations involved in the Movimento dos Sem Teto da Bahia (MSTB, Movimento of Those Without A Roof) and the international non‐profit Architecture Sans Frontieres‐UK (ASF‐UK). MSTB is a political movement that was established in 2003 and currently represents 4000 families in 22 different informal occupations in Salvador. The two key government institutions involved in the conflict were SEDUR (The Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Bahia, Secretary of Urban 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Development of Bahia) and SAEB (The Secretaria de Administração do Estado da Bahia, The State of Bahia  Administration Secretariat). SEDUR is responsible for implementing housing policy and urban planning in the state of Bahia and SAEB is responsible for mediating conflict resolution over land disputes. Finally, COELBA represented the interests of private capital as the landowner in the conflict.  
The relationship between COELBA and the residents of Escada exhibit several interesting aspects of the role played by land speculation in housing policy. After an initial eviction of the informal occupants of the area, residents shortly returned. As discussed earlier this is a common pattern with informal communities: after forcible removal many tenants return to the same communities or existing communities nearby. But in this case the return of the residents to Escada was believed to have been encouraged by the landowners, COELBA. Despite publicly denouncing the informal residents, COELBA used the return of the residents as a means of negotiating with the state of Bahia to obtain an alternative land plot; this was in exchange for allowing the returning residents to stay. As a result, SEDUR did indeed grant COELBA a larger, more valuable land plot in return for relinquishing its land to the informal residents. In short, landowners made use of low‐income occupants to advance their own speculative causes.  
A second issue for the residents in Escada stemmed from something known as ‘consolidation.’ The community was clearly in need of formal housing for its growing number of residents, housing which could be provided through a number of programs, like Minha Casa, Minha Vida. However, to accomplish this, a number of 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licensing processes have to be completed before funding can be obtained. In particular, the existing housing stock cannot be in the form known as  ‘consolidated.’ According to SAEB, consolidated communities are made of permanent structures with less degradable materials. If housing has been considered “consolidated,” then the community can only access funds to upgrade the area. The investigation conducted by ASF‐UK revealed that informal occupants and social organizations that work with residents were unaware of this and that Escada was indeed considered consolidated.  
This holds important implications for other informal communities within the city, as it allows the government to exclude more permanent communities from the process of regularization; i.e., the processes that can grant them legal land tenure and legitimate housing security. This can create other problems in the community, such as difficulty accessing reliable infrastructure for water and electricity (Moreira de Carvalho, 2007). This is due to differences in the bureaucratic process, such as the origins of funding to carry out the projects. Without this assistance, residents are often forced to rely on over‐priced, bootleg utility connections that continue to solidify their lower socioeconomic positions.  
Additionally, this explains further the underuse of the regularization process in the municipality of Salvador. This is because confusion surrounding the definition of consolidation and its significance demonstrates the lack of cooperation and communication between the actors involved in housing provision. In particular, communication is lacking between on the on hand the organizations that aid 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informal residents and on the other, the government institutions that implement policy. Some organizations, such as the MSTB, specifically seek to solve problems in informal communities without cooperating with municipal policy makers due to differences in political ideology, but this is not the norm. There are a number of other social organizations that attempt to cooperate and reach agreements with local government policy makers, but are left outside of the process. This suggests the intentional exclusion of residents and social organizations on a number of social, political, and economic grounds.  
The Case of Coasta Azul: The Favelas of Recanto Feliz and Paraíso Azul 
 Figure 6 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The history of the informal communities of Recanto Feliz and Paraíso Azul in the area of Costa Azul in Salvador provide additional and illuminating windows on the practices of informal residents and the politics surrounding their presence. Notably both favelas show once again the tendency of informal residents to return after forcible relocation, the influence of capital on that expulsion process, and the way residents along with supporting social organizations, come together collectively to resist relocation. It also illustrates the confusing processes involved in the attempt to sell and privately develop the public land in question. There are some interesting contrasts here with the way residents in Escada were used as objects of land speculation so as to remain in their community 
Costa Azul is located on the Orla Maritim Atlantic shore in Salvador, bordering the middleclass neighborhoods of Pituba, Stiep, Jardim Armação, and Boca do Rio, and contains the informal communities of Recanto Feliz, Cai Duro and Paraíso Azul. The area began as a residential area for employees of Petrobrás in 1968. Rapid growth and densification of the area in the late 1970s was then prompted by the construction of the Iguatemi Mall and improvements in the city’s transportation system. The subsequent explosion in residential and commercial construction brought an influx of low‐income rural migrants from the interior of Bahia searching for better employment opportunities, and forming the first favelas in the area. The first occupants settled in the abandoned Old Hotel of Costa Azul and on an abandoned go‐kart track in the neighborhood of Stiep, forming the informal communities of Recanto Feliz and Paraíso Azul. Initially, with the beginning of the construction of the Parque Costa Azul (Costa Azul Parque) these communities were 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removed and transferred to formal housing in other areas of the city. Shortly after, the original occupants returned to the area, even while in this instance they had been placed in formal housing units.  
 They now re‐established themselves, albeit in a precarious fashion, in an area owned at the time by the Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensão do Servidor da Bahia (or IAPSEB: The Institute of Savings and Pensions of the Workers of Bahia). There was an existing, small informal occupation next to a lake, which served as the only source of water for a community that also lacked electricity. In the early 1980’s, as more residents began to arrive, IAPSEB began to attempt to control the influx of residents by registering families in the area. This was to actively monitor the growth in the, and passively discourage new tenants. However, this was not an effective means of deterring family members and other residents from locating there and the area began to rapidly densify.  In addition, rapid formal development in adjacent areas in combination with rising land values once more raised the issue of their presence there. 
Beginning in the 1990’s, more aggressive measures were attempted to permanently remove the two communities so that the land could be formally developed. Beginning in January of 1990, the residents of Recanto Feliz were met with the sudden demolition of their homes but returned immediately to reestablish themselves. This continued in the following year, with a cyclical process of residents being removed and immediately returning due to what was for them an overwhelming lack of other housing options. During this process, residents of both 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neighborhoods sought assistance from other social organizations. This was because, first in 1995, IAPSEB, the government body responsible for the public land parcel, was granted the right to reclaim management over the public land upon occupied by the two communities; and second, new legislation was passed in order to allow the sale of the land for private development. These moves met with resistance. After securing the support of the Social Service of the Monastery of São Bento and the Foundation of the Association of Santa Rosa de Lima Residents, residents of Recanto Feliz and Paraíso Azul, united as one, worked to receive funding to improve the area through bettering urban infrastructure. Through these social organizations, residents filed a civil suit against the state of Bahia and the new legislation that sought to facilitate sale of the occupied land for private development. Other tactics included protests and demonstrations, publishing announcements in local media, and seeking support from other local organizations and politicians. The purpose was to demonstrate the permanence of the communities, the patterns of relocation and return, and to draw attention to the exclusionary nature of the legislation that sought to remove residents and to favor the interests of private developers.  
The communities continued to be met with opposition from private development interests, IAPSEB, and other actors in the community before finally achieving the right to remain, though the realization of this remained in doubt for some time. In June of 1999, the state government authorized the Companhia de Desenvolvimento do Estado da Bahia (CONDER orThe Development Company of the State of Bahia) to begin studies to best advise how to urbanize the communities through the low‐income housing program known as Viver Melhor. The process advanced as far as the 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presentation of the plans for urbanization to the community before stalling. In late 2001, the election of a new governor César Borges, saw more attempts to put the land up for sale and private development.1 Nevertheless, before the election of a new governor, the social organizations had sought support from the State Planning Secretary Armando Avena in 2000, who ruled the communities as a permanent feature of the area. After continued pressure, the state legislative assembly transferred the ownership of both communities to CONDER in 2003 to begin the process of upgrading the infrastructure in the area.  
The project began in 2005, but again there was opposition. On this occasion, it was from the residents of a nearby condominium development, who filed legal action against the project on the grounds that it adversely affected the nearby Parque das Dunas, a city park. In reality, if the communities remained in the area, the condominiums were likely to experience a decrease in value due to their location in close proximity to the informal communities. If sold for private development, more formal commercial or residential structures would replace the informal and boost the land and aesthetic value of entire area. After another protest with heavy media coverage, the community was able to publicize the discriminatory and exclusionary nature of the condominium’s suit and restart the urbanization projects. The events in the communities of Recanto Feliz and Paraíso Azul clearly show the importance of the collective action of residents, social organizations, and political allies in claiming rights to remain.                                                         1 This complicated bureaucratic process is common in attempts to remove and relocate informal communities, as in the Escada case, and often creates issues for the organizations assisting residents. 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Through the urbanization and infrastructure projects, many of these problems encountered in Recanto Feliz, Paraíso Azul, and other informal communities are beginning to be addressed. Specifically for the communities in Costa Azul, the area began to undergo transformations brought on by infrastructure projects proposed by SEDUR and CONDER. These projects aimed to address several issues in the communities: 
 Supply residents in existing situations of risk with new housing. 
 Execute better‐planned housing. 
 Supply better urban infrastructure, including: sewage, pavement, rain drainage, and environmental protection. 
 Provide assistance to families being relocated. 
 Implement community organization, sanitary and environmental education, and generate employment and income in the communities. Just over 27% of the financed budget for this project was provided through state government financing through the program Pró‐Moradia for a total of R$13,506,783.52 (U.S. $6,178,489.03). The project constructed 400 new housing units, with a mix of apartment, village, and multistory style units. As previously mentioned, a restriction imposed by this and other housing programs is that the beneficiaries are prohibited from the sale and rental of their new housing. After changes to the initial program requirements, residents were only able to sell the units after a ten‐year waiting period. However this was not stringently enforced. As a result, as many as 10% of the constructed units were sold for prices ranging between R$8,000 and $25,000 so that beneficiaries could relocate to a less 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urbanized community of Baixa Fria in the neighborhood Boca do Rio. Once again it is clear formal housing programs are not successful in retaining all participants and that the influences of rising land values and difficulties of adjusting to formal  financial and housing structures often motivate the return to informal housing.  
Conclusions Massive rural to urban land migrations and the constraints of the global capitalist economic system have created a shortage of available housing for low‐income populations in developing countries. The precarious social circumstances of these low‐income populations leaves them with few alternatives within their social, political, and economic reach. As a result, this is solved through the invasion of both public and private unused land to form informal communities as an alternative to high‐priced residential housing. The illegal, informal status of these communities due to their lack of a legal land title creates conflict between informal residents and the owners of the land that seek their removal. This is enforced by urban land scarcity leading to higher land values, in which the landowner has an interest in selling the land plots for private development. Governance structures also seek to 
Figure 6: Recanto Feliz before intervention and 
urbanization. 
Figure 7: Recanto Feliz after intervention and 
urbanization. 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replace informal communities with populations from which  they may collect higher taxes. These circumstances have led to the structuring of housing policies that seek to remove and relocate informal communities to other parts of the city, often in formal housing programs. However, these programs rarely address the structural problems that lead to the formation of informal communities. In fact, the social welfare of program participants is often worse than in their previous informal communities. They are likely to return to informal areas from the inability to adjust to formal housing and financial structures. As a result, this creates a cyclical process of removal, relocation, and return to other land invasions.  Housing policy in the city of Salvador, Brazil was examined to attempt to uncover the motivations and interests of those in the housing policy creation and implementation process. Through this examination, the effects of the policies were seen to worsen the social, political, and economic welfare of informal residents. These residents are marginalized socially, politically, and economically in aspects of housing policy and programs as a result of the exclusion of multiple actors in these processes. By using the case studies of Escada, Recanto Feliz, and Paraíso Azul, the permanence of these true communities can be seen. These favelas also show the effects of housing policy and the attempts at removal, which led to their ultimate return. The influences of land speculation, exclusion, and political marginalization were all apparent in each case study. With the incorporation of multiple actors in the creation and implementation of housing policy, the financing of the state could be best used to more permanently address the issues of informal communities. 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There is still a great deal to be examined in context with informal communities in order to fully comprehend how these communities work, so as to best create policies that address the housing deficit. First, it is imperative to better understand the social connections and networks established in these communities. This can help to explain specific motivations for settling in certain areas, due to family ties or other social links. A better understanding of the economic circumstances and the operation of the informal economy can assist in the formation of financial structures that best address the needs of informal residents. This can include the operation of informal credit and how informal employment operates within the community. The function of social and community organization is also important to better understand how various actors can be included in the policy implementation process. In conclusion, there is much to be discovered about the residents that form the vibrant urban informal communities of cities in developing countries. 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